Introduction
The probabilistic treatment of uncertainty plays an important role in many applications of knowledge representation and reasoning. Often, we need to reason with uncertain information under partial knowledge and then the use of precise probabilistic assessments seems unrealistic. Moreover, the family of uncertain quantities at hand has often no particular algebraic structure.
In such cases, a general approach is obtained by using (conditional and/or unconditional) probabilistic constraints, based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and suitable generalizations of it [BIA 00, COL 94, COL 96, COL 99a, COL 99b, GIL 95b, GIL 02, GIL 94, SCO 96], or on similar principles that have been adopted for lower and upper probabilities [PEL 98, WAL 91] . Two important aspects in dealing with uncertainty are: (i) checking the consistency of a probabilistic assessment, and (ii) the propagation of a given assessment to further uncertain quantities.
Another approach for handling probabilistic constraints is model-theoretic probabilistic logic, whose roots go back to Boole's book of 1854 "The Laws of Thought" [BOO 54 ]. There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored in probabilistic logic, which ranges from constraints for unconditional and conditional events [AMA 91, FRI 94, LUK 99a, LUK 99b, LUK 01, NIL 86] to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events [FAG 90] . The main problems related to model-theoretic probabilistic logic are checking satisfiability, deciding logical consequence, and computing tight logically entailed intervals.
Coherence-based and model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning have been explored quite independently from each other by two different research communities. For this reason, the relationship between the two areas has not been studied in depth so far. The current paper and our work in [BIA 01] aim at filling this gap. More precisely, our research is essentially guided by the following two questions:
-Which is the semantic relationship between probabilistic reasoning under coherence and model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning?
-Is it possible to use algorithms that have been developed for efficient reasoning in one area also in the other area?
Interestingly, it turns out that the answers to these two questions are closely related to default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases in System § . The literature contains several different proposals for default reasoning and extensive work on its desired properties. The core of these properties are the rationality postulates of System § proposed by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [KRA 90 ]. It turned out that these rationality postulates constitute a sound and complete axiom system for several classical model-theoretic entailment relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. More precisely, they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment under preferential structures [ In this paper, we show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is reducible to model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning using concepts from default reasoning. Crucially, we even show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is a generalization of default reasoning in System § . That is, we give a new probabilistic semantics for System § The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
-We define a coherence-based probabilistic logic. In particular, we define a formal language of logical and conditional constraints, which are defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We then define the concepts of generalized coherence (or simply g-coherence) and of g-coherent entailment for this language.
-We explore the relationship between coherence-based and model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning. It turns out that the former generalizes default reasoning in System D is a truth assignment to the basic events in¨(that is, a mapping 
Probability assessments
We next define conditional events, (precise) probability assessments on conditional events, and the notion of coherence for such probability assessments.
A conditional event is an expression of the form ! r with events ! and . It can be looked at as a three-valued logical entity, with values 
, and 
We recall that in the framework of subjective probability, given an event We point out that the coherence-based probabilistic approach is more general than the usual one, because to assess conditional probabilities we do not rely on unconditional probabilities. In fact, in our framework the probability assessment § i k " 
In the framework of betting criterion, 
Imprecise probability assessments
We now describe imprecise probability assessments on conditional events and the concepts of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment for such assessments.
An imprecise probability assessment . We say
is g-coherent iff there exists a coherent precise probability assessment
We recall a characterization of g-coherence due to Gilio [GIL 95b]; equivalent results have been obtained by Coletti [COL 94] . Given a set of logical constraints and a set of conditional events 
Probabilistic logic under coherence
We now define conditional constraints, probabilistic knowledge bases, and the notions of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases. In the rest of this paper, we assume that¨is finite.
A conditional constraint is an expression of the form 
Every imprecise probability assessment
with finite on a finite set of conditional events z can be represented by the probabilistic knowledge base
Conversely, every probabilistic knowledge base
can be expressed by the following imprecise probability assessment
and conditional constraints
We give an example to illustrate the concept of a probabilistic knowledge base and the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment.
Example 2.2 Consider the following probabilistic knowledge base
In probabilistic logic under coherence, ® 1 may represent the logical knowledge "all penguins are birds", the logical default knowledge "generally, birds have legs" and "generally, birds fly", and the probabilistic default knowledge "generally, penguins fly with a probability of at most 0.05". It is not difficult to see that ® $ is g-coherent, and that some tight g-coherent consequences of ® $ are given as follows:
Here, the interval "} p T i q " is due to the fact that the logical property of having legs is not inherited from birds down to penguins.
Relationship to model-theoretic probabilistic logic
In this section, we explore the relationship between probabilistic logic under coherence and model-theoretic probabilistic logic. We first briefly recall the main concepts of model-theoretic probabilistic logic. We then show how the notion of g-coherence can be reduced to the existence of satisfying probabilistic interpretations in modeltheoretic probabilistic logic. Moreover, we show that g-coherent entailment can be reduced to logical entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic. We finally describe the rough relationship between g-coherence and satisfiability (resp., strong satisfiability), and between g-coherent entailment and logical entailment.
Model-theoretic probabilistic logic
We now briefly recall the main concepts of model-theoretic probabilistic logic. In particular, we define probabilistic interpretations and the semantics of events, logical constraints, and conditional constraints under probabilistic interpretations. We then define the notions of satisfiability and logical entailment.
sum up to 1). The probability of an event in the probabilistic interpretation
, is defined as the sum of all
. For events and
. The truth of logical and conditional constraints
, is defined by:
We say
. We say Ê 8 Ë satisfies a set of logical and conditional constraints
We next define the notion of logical entailment. A conditional constraint
is a logical consequence of a set of logical and conditional constraints
) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of
. Note that we define e t q and t m p , when
is satisfiable (resp., strongly satisfiable). A conditional constraint
Example 3.1 Consider again the probabilistic knowledge base 
Here, we have the empty set "} q ¡ p ũ " in the last two conditional constraints, as the logical property of being able to fly is inherited from birds down to penguins, and is then incompatible there with "penguins fly with a probability of at most 0.05".
G-coherence in model-theoretic probabilistic logic
The following theorem shows how g-coherence can be expressed through the existence of satisfying probabilistic interpretations. This result follows from Theorem 2.1. Roughly, it says that
and that
The next theorem shows that g-coherence has a characterization similar to the one of × -consistency in default reasoning by Goldszmidt 
In a companion paper [BIA 01], we use Theorem 3.3 to give a new algorithm for deciding g-coherence, which is essentially a reformulation of a previous algorithm by Gilio [GIL 95b ] using terminology from default reasoning, and which is closely related to an algorithm for checking 
G-coherent entailment in model-theoretic probabilistic logic
We now show that g-coherent entailment can be reduced to logical entailment. We first give some preparative definitions.
For probabilistic knowledge bases
and events
The following theorem shows that the tight interval entailed under g-coherence can be expressed as the intersection of some logically entailed tight intervals. It says that
. This follows from Theorem 3.2, which implies that the tight interval } X X entailed under g-coherence is the intersection of all
) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of subject to 
, where
Clearly, this reduction of g-coherent entailment to logical entailment is computationally expensive, as we have to compute a tight logically entailed interval for each member of § 7 ß ¶ " ) ® 
Thus, computing tight g-coherent consequences can be reduced to computing tight logical consequences from the greatest element § 
Hence, by Theorems 3.6 and 3.7, the tight interval under g-coherent entailment can be computed by first computing § by a g-coherence check, and then computing the tight interval under logical entailment from § . This new algorithm for computing tight g-coherent consequences has been formulated in a companion paper [BIA 01].
Semantically, Theorems 3.6 and 3.7 draw a precise picture of the relationship between g-coherent entailment and logical entailment. They show that g-coherent entailment coincides with logical entailment from a smaller probabilistic knowledge base. That is, under g-coherent entailment, we simply cut away a part of the knowledge base. Roughly speaking, we remove every conditional constraint
Intuitively, g-coherent entailment does not have the property of inheritance, neither for logical knowledge nor for probabilistic knowledge, while logical entailment shows inheritance of logical knowledge, but not of probabilistic knowledge. The following example illustrates this difference.
Example 3.8 Consider the following probabilistic knowledge base:
Observe that ® 1 is g-coherent and strongly satisfiable. Notice then that by Theorem 3.6 the conditional constraint
iff it is a tight logical consequence of
. By this characterization, the following tight g-coherent consequences of ® $ are immediate:
Moreover, we have the following tight logical consequences of
In summary, under g-coherent entailment, neither the logical property of having legs nor the probabilistic one of having wings is inherited from birds to penguins. Under logical entailment, the logical property is inherited, while the probabilistic one is not.
Coherence-based versus model-theoretic probabilistic logic
We now describe the rough relationship between g-coherence and satisfiability (resp., strong satisfiability), and between g-coherent entailment and logical entailment. The following theorem shows that g-coherence implies satisfiability, and that strong satisfiability implies g-coherence. That is, g-coherence lies between satisfiability and strong satisfiability. These results are immediate by Theorem 3.2. The following example shows that the converse statements generally do not hold. That is, strong satisfiability is strictly stronger than g-coherence, and g-coherence itself is strictly stronger than satisfiability. 
(b) The probabilistic knowledge base
is g-coherent, but not strongly satisfiable.
The following theorem shows that logical entailment is stronger than g-coherent entailment. That is, g-coherent consequence implies logical consequence (or there are more conditional constraints logically entailed than entailed under g-coherence) and the tight intervals that are entailed under logical entailment are subintervals of those entailed under g-coherent entailment. This result is immediate by Theorem 3.6. 
The next example shows that logical entailment is in fact strictly stronger than g-coherent entailment (recall that we identify } q p ũ w ith the empty set).
Example 3.12 Consider the following probabilistic knowledge bases
It is not difficult to see that 
Relationship to default reasoning in System ð
In this section, we explore the relationship between probabilistic reasoning under coherence and default reasoning in System § . We show that consistency and entailment in System § are special cases of g-coherence and g-coherent entailment, respectively. That is, probabilistic logic under coherence gives a new probabilistic semantics for System § , which is neither based on infinitesimal probabilities [ 
Example 4.1
The logical knowledge "all penguins are birds" and the logical default knowledge "generally, birds have legs", "generally, birds fly", and "generally, penguins do not fly" can be expressed by the following conditional knowledge base:
G-coherence and ü -consistency
We now show that g-coherence is a generalization of A similar result holds for the notion of g-coherence, which follows from Theorem 3.3 (b), and which is subsequently formulated using the following concepts. 
is g-coherent iff the conditional knowledge base
G-coherent entailment and ü -entailment
We now show that g-coherent entailment is a generalization of × -entailment. We recall the following result, which is essentially due to Adams [ADA 75], who formulated it for the notions of 
The following theorem shows that a similar result holds for g-coherent consequence. It is an immediate implication of the definition of g-coherent entailment. 
The next theorem for tight g-coherent consequence completes the picture. This result follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 3.4. 
The following theorem finally shows that g-coherent entailment is a generalization of × -entailment. This result follows from Theorems 3.2 and 4.5-4.7.
Theorem 4.9 Let
® $ t " ) h ¡ " ! f r h i & }` # i i i " 2 ! C r v w & } q i q # ¢ y & be a g-coherent prob- abilistic knowledge base. Then, ® $ r µ o " 2 « rA C & } q i q iff the conditional knowledge base " 2 h ¡ ! ñ 4 i ! ñ 4 ¢ y & h × -entails « ñ Õ A .
Relationship to default reasoning with conditional objects
We now relate probabilistic reasoning under coherence to default reasoning with conditional objects, which goes back to Dubois and Prade [DUB 94, BEN 97].
We associate with each set of defaults
. Given a nonempty set of conditional events 
. We assume the total order 
Conclusion and outlook
We explored how probabilistic reasoning under coherence is related to modeltheoretic probabilistic reasoning and to default reasoning in System § . As for the relationship between probabilistic logic under coherence and modeltheoretic probabilistic logic, we showed that g-coherence and g-coherent entailment can be reduced to the existence of satisfying probabilistic interpretations and to logical entailment, respectively, using concepts from default reasoning. We observed especially that g-coherent entailment coincides with logical entailment from a smaller knowledge base, and that logical entailment has the property of inheritance of logical knowledge, while g-coherent entailment does not. Furthermore, g-coherence is stronger than satisfiability and weaker than strong satisfiability, while g-coherent entailment is weaker than logical entailment.
The above semantic results also paved the way for a precise complexity characterization and new algorithms for the problems of deciding g-coherence and of com-puting tight g-coherent intervals. Note especially that the new algorithms for deciding g-coherence and for computing tight g-coherent intervals are based on a reduction to standard reasoning tasks in model-theoretic probabilistic logic, and thus efficient techniques for model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning can immediately be applied for probabilistic reasoning under coherence (for example, column generation techniques). These new results on complexity and algorithms for probabilistic reasoning under coherence have been presented in a companion paper [BIA 01]. and by
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is a probabilistic interpretation with
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, and thus 
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, there exists a model
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We first prove that
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We next show that for every element Ý }i b ~
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